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This paper develops a model of choice that embeds some psychological
aspects aﬀecting decision maker’s behaviour. In the model, the decision
maker attaches an unobservable psychological index—representing, e.g., the
level of perceived availability or the level of salience—to each alternative
in a universal collection. Choice behaviour of the decision maker is then
conditioned by the indexes attached to the alternatives. With this paper
we show that, if the conditional choice behaviour satisﬁes two intuitively
appealing properties—namely Monotonicity and Conditional IIA—then the
observable part of the choice behaviour, i.e., the unconditional choices, can
be interpreted as the product of the maximization of a preference relation.
The paper discusses also some welfare consideration regarding the choice
model and ﬁnally some interpretations of the indexes are provided.
JEL Keywords: Revealed preferences, choice with frame, salience, scarcity bias,
bandwagon and snob eﬀect
JEL Class: D11
1 Introduction
The standard model of choice (see Richter, 1966; Sen, 1971) considers a uni-
versal collection of alternatives X that are the possible objects of choice and
deﬁnes a choice problem A as a non–empty subset of the universal collection
X. In this model, both the environmental information that is not–necessary
for describing and identifying the elements of the choice problem—i.e., ancil-
lary information—and the psychological aspects involving the alternatives—
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1e.g., salience and emotive states—are assumed to be irrelevant for choices
made by economic agents. Choices are formalized by means of a corre-
spondence C() that attaches to each choice problem a non–empty subset
of alternatives C(A)—C(A) ⊆ A ∀A ∈ D, where D is the class of all choice
problems—and choices are independent of ancillary information and the psy-
chological state of the agent. Therefore the choice is assumed to be unaﬀected
by, for example, the order of the alternatives, the description of the situation,
the number of times an alternative is repeated in the choice set, or various
levels of salience that in diﬀerent situations are attached to the alternatives.
The only thing that matters is the composition of the set A, and once the el-
ements of A have been deﬁned then there are no ways to change the elements
chosen from A.
This paper borrows the idea developed by Bernheim and Rangel (2008)
and Salant and Rubinstein (2008) that additional components should be at-
tached to the choice problem in order to capture the eﬀect on choices of un-
observable information and psychological states. That is, the authors allow
choices to be conditioned by abstract entities they call “frames”, and conse-
quently, the decision maker can choose diﬀerent elements from the same set
of alternatives based on the frame that is attached to the set. Using the same
approach this paper proposes a more specialized conceptualization of frame.
We link each alternative in the choice problem with an index that represents
an unobservable physical or psychological measure that the decision maker
attaches to each alternative in the set. This index can be interpreted in
various ways. For instance it can be interpreted as a measure of perceived
availability of the alternative, or as the level of salience that the alternative
possesses in the speciﬁc situation, or as the level of perceived popularity of
that alternative in a reference group. All these interpretations are examined
in detail below.
The paper shows that if choices from these sets of indexed alternatives
satisfy some intuitively appealing properties, then observing the uncondi-
tional behaviour, one cannot distinguish between these choices and choices
produced by the maximization of a preference relation that is complete and
2quasi–transitive1. The paper then examines in depth the connection between
the proposed model and the more general model of “choice with frames” de-
veloped by Salant and Rubinstein (2008). Afterwards some welfare consid-
erations are discussed, and ﬁnally some examples of how these indexes can
be interpreted are discussed in more detail.
2 Model
As mentioned before, the main idea of this paper is to attach to each al-
ternative in a ﬁnite universal collection X an index that can reﬂect some
unobservable physical or psychological feature that the alternatives possess.
Hence, instead of deﬁning a choice problem simply as a subset A of the collec-
tion X, we consider an indexed choice problem Af that is a non–empty subset
A of X along with a function f from X into R, that we will call index func-
tion. That is, an index function f attaches a real number to each alternative
present in X. As we will see, the indexes attached to the alternatives can be
interpreted in various ways. For instance, these indexes can be interpreted
as perceived availability of the alternative by the decision maker, as an index
of salience of the alternative, or as the number of people already possessing
that alternative. In this model a set of alternatives A is part of many choice
problems. Indeed, each set A coupled with distinct index functions deﬁne
distinct choice problems and hence the set of all the indexed choice problem
D∗ becomes D∗ = (P(X) − ∅) × RX.
Having deﬁned the concept of choice problem used here, we will use stan-
dard deﬁnitions concerning choice functions and choice correspondences. We
use the term choice function for a function c() that attaches to each choice
problem A ∈ D a single element in A, while we use the term choice cor-
respondence for a correspondence C() that attaches to each choice problem
A ∈ D a non–empty subset of A. Therefore, given a choice problem, a choice
function selects only one chosen element among the available alternatives
while a choice correspondence can select many chosen elements among the
1A quasi–transitive preference relation is a preference relation for which the strict
preference part is transitive and the indiﬀerence part is not necessarily transitive.
3available alternatives.
In what follows we assume that a decision maker has a choice function
c()—called indexed choice function—that is deﬁned over the set of all the
indexed choice problems D∗ and selects a single chosen item from the set of
available alternatives. It has to be noted that in this framework one can al-
low for changes in the chosen alternatives according to the index function at-
tached to the choice set. Indeed, a decision maker facing a set of alternatives
A can choose an alternative x from A when the choice problem is Af while
he can choose an alternative y when the choice problem is Ag. Moreover, an
indexed choice function c() deﬁned over D∗ induces a choice correspondence
C() deﬁned over D = P(X)−∅ such that C(A) =
 
f∈RX c(Af). The induced
choice correspondence just deﬁned includes all the elements that are chosen
from a set A for some function f. That is, given a set A, x belongs to the
induced choice correspondence C(A) if and only if there is a function f ∈ RX
such that c(Af) = x.
The reason motivating the introduction of an induced choice correspon-
dence is the fact that in many cases the index that is attached to each alterna-
tive is unobservable by an external observer while it can be perfectly known
by the decision maker—e.g., interpreting the indexes as levels of perceived
availability of the alternative or as levels of salience. In such cases an observer
of the choice behaviour of the decision maker will be unable to distinguish
the circumstances under which the decision maker chooses the alternative x
over the alternative y and under which he chooses x over y. Hence the ob-
server can simply record that the individual have chosen both. There are also
cases in which the indexes attached to the alternatives can be known—e.g.,
interpreting the value as the number of people that already possess the alter-
native or as the supply of that alternative in the market. However, in such
cases it may be diﬃcult to observe the indexes and interesting to disregard
the information about the values attached to each alternative by focusing on
the unconditional behaviour of the decision maker.
So far we have imposed no restriction on the indexed choice function, that
is there are no limitations in what the decision maker can choose from a set
A under diﬀerent indexes attached to the alternatives. Obviously without
4limitations one can obtain every type of choice behaviour and hence we should
introduce some restrictions on the behaviour of the indexed choice function
c() under a given index function. This is done by introducing two properties,
the ﬁrst binds the behaviour of the indexed choice function when the indexes
of the alternatives are ﬁxed and the choice problem can vary, while the second
binds the behaviour of the indexed choice function when the choice problem
is ﬁxed and the indexes attached to the alternatives can vary.
The ﬁrst property of the choices over the set of all the indexed choice
problems is called Conditional IIA.
Def (Conditional IIA). If x ∈ B ⊂ A and x = c(Ai) for some i ∈ RX, then
x = c(Bi).
This property says that having ﬁxed an index function i, the indexed
choice function c() satisﬁes the standard Independence from Irrelevant Al-
ternatives property (IIA). Conditional IIA captures the idea that if the index
function has not been changed, the elimination of a non–chosen alternative
from the set has no eﬀect on the chosen alternative that must remain the
same as chosen before the elimination occurred. In other words this prop-
erty says that once the decision maker has a complete psychological picture
of the alternatives in X—i.e., he/she has attached to each alternative in the
universal collection a psychological value—and has decided to choose one al-
ternative from a choice problem A according to this picture, then removing
a non-chosen alternative and holding ﬁxed the psychological situation does
not change his/her mind.
In the next section, we will show that Conditional IIA will imply that the
induced choice correspondence satisﬁes Sen’s property α2, but for the moment
it has to be noted that Conditional IIA with the fact that the indexed choice
function is single valued imply that there exists a linear ordering ≻i such
that its maximization describes the choices of c() over D whenever the index
function is i, i.e., c(Ai) = {x ∈ A | ∀y ∈ A,x ≻i y} for all Ai ∈ D∗.
Hence the decision maker can be considered as completely rational when
the index function is kept constant and moreover he cannot be indiﬀerent
2see the Appendix for the deﬁnition of this property.
5between two alternatives. This means that indiﬀerence emerges only because
of the unobservability of the indexes attached to the alternatives and that
all the irrationality in the decision maker’s behaviour is captured by indexes’
movements. In other words, the decision maker is never indiﬀerent between
two alternatives, but he/she can reverse the preferences according to the
particular index function attached to the choice set. Indiﬀerence is only in the
eyes of the external observer, but we will discuss afterward the interpretation
of indiﬀerence in this model.
The second property of choices over the set of all the indexed choice
problems is the Monotonicity property which is composed of two parts.
Def (Monotonicity). For each x ∈ X either
x ↑. for all Bj ∈ D∗: x = c(Bj) ⇒ ∀j′ such that j′(x) > j(x) and j′(a) =
j(a) ∀a ∈ X − {x}, x = c(Bj′) and; x  = c(Bj) = y ⇒ ∀j′ such that
j′(x) < j(x) and j′(a) = j(a) ∀a ∈ X − {x}, y = c(Bj′) or,
x ↓. for all Bj ∈ D∗: x = c(Bj) ⇒ ∀j′ such that j′(x) < j(x) and j′(a) =
j(a) ∀a ∈ X − {x}, x = c(Bj′) and; x  = c(Bj) = y ⇒ ∀j′ such that
j′(x) > j(x) and j′(a) = j(a) ∀a ∈ X − {x}, y = c(Bj′).
Monotonicity means that, if an item is chosen under some circumstances,
it has to be chosen when its index is altered in a given direction. More pre-
cisely, in case of alternatives of type ‘↑’, whenever the alternative is chosen,
an increase in its index cannot aﬀect choices. While in case of alternatives
of type ‘↓’, whenever the alternative is chosen, a decrease in its index cannot
aﬀect choices. Obviously there can be alternatives for which both ‘↑’ and
‘↓’ hold true. In this case we use the notation ‘ ’ and we have that, when-
ever those alternatives are chosen, both decreasing and increasing the index
attached to them cannot alter the choice. Monotonicity has also implica-
tions for movements of the indexes of non–chosen alternatives. In particular,
Monotonicity implies that if an alternative that is chosen continues to be
chosen increasing (decreasing) its index, then when non–chosen a decrease
(increase) in its index does not alter the chosen alternative.
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natives in X, hence it applies also to the alternatives that do not belong to
the current choice problem. This means that, for instance, if x / ∈ A and x
is of type ‘↑’, then reducing the index attached to x the alternative chosen
from A does not change. We are aware that conditioning the behaviour of
the indexed choice function to the index of an alternative that is not under
consideration may appear quite counterintuitive. However, since an alter-
native that is not in the current choice problem cannot be chosen, it turns
out that Monotonicity implies that the indexes of alternatives outside the
current choice problem do not have any eﬀect on choices. In order to see this
we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If c() is an indexed choice function satisfying Monotoniticy, x  =
c(Ai) for all i ∈ RX, and y = c(Aj) for an index function j ∈ RX then for
all k such that k(x)  = j(x) and k(a) = j(a) ∀a ∈ X − {x} we have that
y = c(Ak)3.
Proof. Let c() be an indexed choice function satisfying Monotoniticy, x  =
c(Ai) for all i ∈ RX, and y = c(Aj) for an index function j ∈ RX. Suppose
now that there is an index function k such that k(x)  = j(x) and k(a) =
j(a) ∀a ∈ X −{x} and y  = c(At) = z. So suppose that w.l.o.g. k(x) > j(x).
In this case if x ↑ we have y = c(Ak) contradicting z = c(Ak), and if x ↓ we
have z = c(Aj) contradicting a = c(Aj).
Notice that Lemma 1 holds not only for those alternatives that do not
belong to the current choice problem, but also for those alternative that are
in the current choice problem but are non–chosen for all the index function.
This means that the indexes of the alternatives that are non–chosen from a
set A have no eﬀect on the choice of the decision maker. To say it in other
words, only the indexes attached to alternatives that are chosen for some
index function i matter for determining the choice of the decision maker. A
3Notice that in the light of this lemma, the Monotonicity property can be restated using
two separate properties: a Monotonicity property restricted to the elements belonging to
the current choice problem plus an Invariance property that excludes the eﬀect of a change
in the indexes of alternatives outside the choice problem.
7ﬁnal implication of Lemma 1 is for those alternatives that are never chosen
in all the choice problems. Indeed Lemma 1 implies that such alternatives
can be only of type ‘ ’.
In order to have a better understanding of how the indexes of the alter-
natives may aﬀect choices it is worth underlining the implications of Mono-
tonicity. How already shown with Lemma 1 the only indexes that may have
eﬀect on choices from a set A are the ones that belong to those alternatives
that are chosen from A at some point. But there is another interesting ob-
servation about the eﬀect of a change of the indexes of such alternatives.
Indeed, if we have that x   is a chosen alternative from A, this implies that
the index of x does not aﬀect the choice of the decision maker in any way.
Both when x is chosen and x is non–chosen from A, an alteration of the index
of x cannot lead to changes in the choice.
If instead we have an alternative x such that x ↑ and not x ↓ then the
index of x has eﬀect on the choice of the decision maker. x ↑ and not x ↓
implies that: either there is a situations Af in which x is chosen and there is
a number k < f(x) for which x is not chosen from A, or there is a situation
Bj in which y  = x is chosen and there is a number t > j(x) for which y in
not chosen from B. Hence there is at least a set in which a movement in
the index of x produces a change in the choice. An interesting observation
is that, in the former case, a reduction in the index of x can change the
choice from x to an element y, but, x ↑ implies that further reductions of the
index do not aﬀect the choice anymore—i.e., once the choice has switched
from x to y a further reduction of the index of x has no consequence for
the choice. In the latter case we have that increasing the index of x up to
t an element diﬀerent from y is chosen, but the element chosen cannot be
diﬀerent from x. Indeed if we suppose that z diﬀerent from x is chosen, we
have that z is chosen from Bj contradicting y = c(Bj). Hence also in case x
is not chosen there can be only a single change due to the eﬀect of the index
of x. Combining the two cases, we have that the situation x ↑ and not x ↓
implies that there is at least a choice set A and a combination of indexes for
the alternatives diﬀerent from x for which there exists a value k such that
x is chosen when its index is above and y  = x is chosen when the index is
8below that threshold4.
A similar situation arises when considering alternatives of type x ↓ and
not x ↑. That is, there is at least a choice set A and a combination of indexes
for the alternatives diﬀerent from x for which there exists a threshold k such
that x is chosen when its index is below and y  = x is chosen when the index
is above that threshold.
After having introduced and explained the two properties that constrain
the behaviour of the indexed choice function we deﬁne the concept of con-
strained indexed choice function.
Def (Constrained indexed choice function). A constrained indexed choice
function is a choice function c() on D∗ that satisﬁes Conditional IIA and
Monotonicity.
The main result of the paper is that the choice correspondence induced
by a constrained indexed choice function can be rationalized by a quasi–
transitive preference relation—i.e., there is a preference relation whose max-
imization produces the same choices produced by the induced choice corre-
spondence—and, moreover, the choices produced by the maximization of a
quasi–transitive preference relation can be produced by a choice correspon-
dence induced by a constrained indexed choice function.
4Suppose the case x ↑ and not x ↓. Then not x ↓ implies either that: (1) ∃Af s.t.
x = c(Ai) and ∃k < i(x) s.t. y = c(Ai′) where i′(a) = i(a)∀a ∈ X and i′(x) = k;
or (2) ∃Bj s.t. z = c(Bj) and ∃k′ > j(x) s.t. x = c(Bj′) where j′(a) = j(a)∀a ∈ X
and j′(x) = k′. Notice that (1) if and only if (2). Hence take (1). First we show that no
elements diﬀerent from x and y can be chosen from A for all the index function f such that
f(a) = i(a)∀a ∈ X − x. Indeed if z = c(Af) for some f such that f(a) = i(a)∀a ∈ X − x
we have that: f(a) ≥ i(x) implies that z = c(Ai) contradicting x = c(Ai), and f(a) < i(x)
this implies either z = c(Ai′) (if f(x) ≥ i′(x)) or y = c(Af) (if f(x) < i′(x)) producing a
contradiction in both cases. Hence no elements diﬀerent from x and y can be chosen from
A for all the index function f such that f(a) = i(a)∀a ∈ X−x. Now we want to show that
there exists a number r for which i(x) > r implies that x is chosen and i(x) < r implies
that y is chosen. In order to do this suppose not, suppose that there are two numbers a
and b such that a > b and y is chosen from A when i(x) = a and x is chosen from A when
i(x) = b. Using again the fact that x ↑ we have that x is chosen from A when i(x) = b
with a > b implies that x is chosen from A when i(x) = a a contradiction. Hence there
has to be a number r for which i(x) > r implies that x is chosen from A and i(x) < r
implies that y is chosen from A. Notice that we cannot say anything about the behaviour
of the choice function when i(x) = r. We just know that one between x and y must be
chosen in r but we do not know which one.
9Theorem. A choice correspondence C() is induced by a constrained indexed
choice function c() if and only if C() is rationalizable by a complete and
quasi–transitive preference relation %.
In order to prove the main statement we need to prove some preliminary
result. In what follows we show that a choice correspondence C() induced
by an indexed choice function c() satisﬁes Sen’s properties α, γ, and δ (Sen,
1971), and hence the revealed preference relation R deﬁned as xRy if and
only if ∃A ⊆ X such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A is a complete and quasi–
transitive binary relation whose optimization produces the same choices as
C()5.
We start proving that the induced choice correspondence C() satisﬁes
properties α and γ.
Lemma 2. The choice correspondence C() induced by a constrained indexed
choice function c() satisﬁes Sen’s properties α and γ.
Proof. Concerning property α suppose that x ∈ C(A), x ∈ B, and B ⊆
A, then for the deﬁnition of induced choice correspondence, i.e. C(A) =
 
f∈RX c(Af), there is an index function i such that x = c(Ai). Then, if
x = c(Ai), for Conditional IIA x = c(Bi) and by deﬁnition of induced choice
correspondence we have that x ∈ C(B). Thus property α is satisﬁed.
Moving to property γ suppose that x ∈ C(A) and x ∈ C(B) then, for the
deﬁnition of induced choice correspondence, there exists an index function f
such that x = c(Af) and an index function i such that x = c(Bi). Now what
is needed in order to have property γ satisﬁed is the existence of an index
function u for which x = c((A∪B)u). The proof is by construction of u and
consists of 2 steps.
Step 1: We start proving that, given x = c(Af) and x = c(Bi), there is
an index function u such that x = c(Au) and x = c(Bu). Consider the index
function u on X deﬁned as follows:
5For the deﬁnitions of Sen’s properties α, γ, and δ see the section 7.
For the proof that a Choice Correspondence C() deﬁned over D = P(X) − ∅ satisﬁes
Sen’s properties α, γ, and δ if and only if there exists a quasi–transitive and complete
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min(f(z),i(z)), if z ↑ ∧¬z ↓ and z  = x;
max(f(z),i(z)), if z ↓ ∧¬z ↑ and z  = x;
max(f(z),i(z)), if z ↑ ∧¬z ↓ and z = x;
min(f(z),i(z)), if z ↓ ∧¬z ↑ and z = x;
f(z), otherwise.
First we prove that x = c(Au). Notice that, by construction of u, for all
the non–chosen alternatives y in X −{x}, we have that: if y ↑, u(y) ≤ f(y);
if y ↓, u(y) ≥ f(y); and if y  , u(y) = f(y). Hence by Monotonicity the
indexes of those alternatives cannot aﬀect the choice. Moreover, concerning
u(x) we have that: if x ↑, u(x) ≥ f(x); if x ↓, u(x) ≤ f(x); and if x  ,
u(x) = f(x). Thus, also in this case Monotonicity prevent that the index of
x aﬀect choices and hence x = c(Au) by Monotonicity.
Now we prove that x = c(Bu). Applying the same reasoning as before we
have that, for all the alternatives in y ∈ X such that y ↑ ∧¬y ↓ or y ↓ ∧¬z ↑,
the change of the index from i to u does not aﬀect the choice. Considering
the alternatives y such that y   notice that u(y) = f(y) that can be diﬀerent
from i(y). But we already know that Monotonicity implies that a change in
the index of an alternative of type ‘y  ’ does not have eﬀect on the chosen
alternative. Hence Monotonicity implies that x = c(Bu).
Step 2: Now we show that x = c(Au) = c(Bu) implies c((A ∪ B)u) = x.
Suppose c((A ∪ B)u) = z  = x, then we have two cases either z ∈ A or
z ∈ B − A. CASE 1: Suppose z ∈ A. In this case z = c(Au) by Conditional
IIA and this contradicts Step 1. CASE 2: Suppose z ∈ B − A. In this
case z = c(Bu) by Conditional IIA, and again a contradiction with Step 1.
Therefore, for non-emptiness of c(), we conclude that c((A ∪ B)u) = x.
In order to complete the proof one needs to note that, by deﬁnition of in-
duced choice correspondence, x = c((A∪B)u) belongs to
 
f∈RX c((A ∪ B)f)
and therefore x ∈ C(A∪B). Thus the induced choice correspondence satisﬁes
Sen’s Property γ.
Since the induced choice correspondence satisﬁes both Sen’s property α
11and γ it is Normal (Sen, 1971). This means that C(A) = R–gr(A) where the
binary relation R is the revealed preference relation—i.e., xRy if and only
if ∃A ⊆ X such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A—and R–gr(A) is the set of the
greatest elements in A according to R—i.e., R–gr(A) = {x ∈ A | xRy ∀y ∈
A}.
The fact that the revealed preference relation R rationalizes the choice
correspondence induced by a constrained indexed choice function implies
that the behaviour of the agent can be interpreted as a maximizing one;
that is, one can retain the classical assumption about the rationality of the
agent: he/she chooses what is the best for him/her according to a complete
and acyclic preference relation. In the light of this result, an interesting
interpretation of the eﬀect of psychological indexes can be given. If the
agent behaves accordingly to a constrained indexed choice function his/her
behaviour can be interpreted “as if” he/she maximizes a weak preference
relation R obtaining a set of preferred items, and then he/she uses a tie
breaking rule based on the “indexes” he/she attaches to the alternatives to
choose one item among the preferred items. Notice that the decision maker
tie–breaking rule is based on regions of the space of the indexes and that
these regions are convex. Indeed if you choose the element x from the set A
both in the situation i and in the situation f, a convex combination of the
indexes is such that min(f(a),i(a)) ≤ σi(a)+(1−σ)f(a) ≤ max(f(a),i(a))
for all the a in A and for all the σ ∈ [0,1], hence Monotonicity guarantees
that x is chosen for all the index function that are convex combinations of
i and f. Thus the decision maker breaks the ties according to the region to
which the current index function belongs to.
What is left to prove is the fact that the revealed preference relation R is
indeed a quasi–transitive preference relation. This is assured by the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. The choice correspondence C() induced by a constrained indexed
choice function c() satisﬁes Sen’s property δ.
Proof. Suppose A ⊂ B, x,y ∈ C(A) and {x} = C(B). {x} = C(B) im-
plies that x = c(Bi) ∀i ∈ RX. Therefore by Conditional IIA one gets that
12x = c(Ai) ∀i ∈ RX that contradicts y ∈ C(A). So the induced choice corre-
spondence satisﬁes Sen’s property δ.
Since the induced choice correspondence satisﬁes Sen’s properties α, γ
and δ, it is Normal and the revealed preference relation R is quasi–transitive
(Sen, 1971). That is, the strict preference relation P—i.e., the asymmetric
part of R—is transitive but the indiﬀerence relation I—i.e., the symmetric
part of R—is not necessarily transitive6.
A speciﬁcation regarding indiﬀerence is due. As already mentioned, in-
diﬀerence is in the eyes of the external observer. When two alternatives x
and y are revealed indiﬀerent this means that there is an index function in
which x is chosen over y and another in which y is chosen over x, and that
the decision maker is not willing to change his choice. That is in the ﬁrst
case he truly prefers x over y and in the second case he truly prefers y over x.
This implies that the interpretation of indiﬀerence in this model is slightly
diﬀerent from the standard one: indiﬀerence should be thought as the ab-
sence of an unambiguous strict preference under all the possible psychological
situations.
So far we have shown that the induced choice correspondence satisﬁes
Sen’s properties α, γ and δ, and hence it is quasi–transitive. Now we show
that it may not be a Weak-order, i.e., it may not satisfy Sen’s property β.
In other to show this consider the following situation, suppose X = {x,y,z}
and suppose that:
1. x = c({x,y,z}i), x = c({x,z}i), x = c({x,y}i), and z = c({z,y}i) for
all the index functions where i(x) ≤ k ∈ R;
2. z = c({x,y,z}i), z = c({x,z}i), y = c({x,y}i), and z = c({z,y}i) for
all the index functions where i(x) > k
This indexed choice function satisﬁes the Monotonicity and Conditional IIA
6The non transitivity of indiﬀerence implies that we can have situations in which
xIy ∧ yIz but zPx. Notice that this situation is not so unnatural. Indeed, there are
no compelling philosophical reasons for requiring transitivity of indiﬀerence. See Luce
(1956) for a discussion about this issue.
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erty β. In fact we have that {x,y} = C({x,y}) and that y / ∈ C({x,y,z}).
The implications of Lemmas 2 and 3 are that, given a choice procedure
that satisﬁes Monotonicity and Conditional IIA, one can interpret the ob-
servable pattern of choices of the agent “as if” he/she is maximizing a quasi–
transitive preference relation. But given an agent that maximizes a quasi–
transitive preference relation it is possible to interpret his behaviour “as if”
he is adopting a choice procedure that satisﬁes Monotonicity and Conditional
IIA? We show this with lemma 4.
Lemma 4. If choices are determined by the maximization of a complete and
quasi–transitive preference relation % on the ﬁnite set X, then there exists a
constrained indexed choice function c() deﬁned over D∗ = (P(X) − ∅) × RX
that induces a choice correspondence C() deﬁned over D = (P(X) − ∅) such
that C(A) = % –gr(A) for all the non–empty subsets A of X7.
Proof. We deﬁne the indexed choice function c() explicitly, and then we prove
that c() satisﬁes Conditional IIA and Monotonicity. Let <O be an arbitrary
linear order on X—i.e., <O is a complete, transitive and antisymmetric bi-
nary relation on X. Deﬁne c(Ai) = x ∀i ∈ RX such that: x ∈ % –gr(A) and,
∀y ∈ % –gr(A), either i(x) < i(y) or i(x) = i(y)∧x <O y. First we show that
the indexed choice function c() just deﬁned is indeed a choice function—i.e.,
that is non–empty and single–valued for all the sets Ai ∈ D∗. Considering
that the set % –gr(A) is ﬁnite and not–empty for each non–empty subset A
of X, the non-emptiness and the single-valuedness of c() for all i ∈ R follow
directly by the fact that a ﬁnite set of numbers in R has always a minimal
element and that <O is a linear order—i.e., the set <O –gr(A) is a singleton
for each subset A of X.
Now we show that c() is a constrained indexed choice function, that is,
c() satisﬁes Conditional IIA and Monotonicity.
7The relation % is complete and the asymmetric part ≻ is transitive, thus the set
% –gr(A) is non–empty for each non–empty subset A of X because of ﬁniteness of X.
Suppose not, then for all x in A there exists y such that ¬x % y that implies y ≻ x and
since the set A is ﬁnite, this lead to a contradiction with transitivity of ≻.
14Conditional IIA: suppose x = c(Ai). Then consider the set B ⊆ A such
that x ∈ B. We show that x = c(Bi). The ﬁrst consideration is that for each
z ∈ B if z ∈ % –gr(A) then it belongs also to % –gr(B). Indeed if z is a %–
greatest element of A it means that z % k for all k ∈ A and hence z % k for all
k ∈ B that in turn implies z ∈ % –gr(B). The second consideration is that,
by deﬁnition of c(), x = c(Ai) implies that x ∈ % –gr(A) and ∀z ∈ % –gr(A),
i(x) < i(z) or i(x) = i(z)∧x <O z. Hence combining the two considerations
we have that for all z ∈ % −gr(B), i(x) < i(z) or i(x) = i(z)∧x <O z. That
implies that x = c(Bi).
Monotonicity: The proof that c() satisﬁes Monotonicity is based on the
fact that increasing the index of a non–chosen alternative y or reducing the
index of the chosen one x does not alter the fact that i(x) ≤ i(y) ∀y ∈ %
–gr(A) and hence does not alter the chosen alternative. Suppose x = c(Ai),
then ∀y ∈ % –gr(A), i(x) < i(y) or i(x) = i(y) ∧ x <O y. Take an index
function f, f(z) = i(z) ∀z ∈ X − {x} and f(x) < i(x). In this case f(x) <
f(y) ∀y ∈ % –gr(A) − {x} and hence, since f(x) = f(x) ∧ x <O x, we have
x = c(Af). Take now and index function f′, f′(z) = i(z)∀z ∈ X − {y},
y  = x, and f′(y) > i(y). In this case f(x) ≤ f(y) ∀y ∈ % –gr(A) and, since
x <O z∀z ∈ % –gr(A) such that i(z) = i(x), then x <O z∀z ∈ % –gr(A) such
that f(z) = f(x). Thus we have x = c(Af′). Therefore each element x in X
satisﬁes the condition x ↓ and hence Monotonicity is satisﬁed.
Therefore the choice function c() on D∗ is a constrained indexed choice
function. What we have left to prove is that the induced choice correspon-
dence C() is such that C(A) = % –gr(A) for all the non–empty subsets A of
X. Suppose x ∈ C(A) =
 
f∈RX c(Af) then it exists an index function i such
that x = c(Ai) and hence x ∈ % –gr(A) by construction of c(). Suppose in-
stead that x ∈ % –gr(A) and consider an index function i in which i(x) < i(y)
for all y in % –gr(A). In this case x = c(Ai) and hence x ∈ C(A). Therefore
the constrained indexed choice function c() is such that C(A) = % –gr(A)
for all the non–empty subsets A of X.
A comment about Lemma 4. Indeed in the proof of Lemma 4 we build a
constrained indexed choice function for which all the alternatives are of type
15‘↓’ and hence, either the index of an alternative has no eﬀect on choices, or
the eﬀect is in one particular direction. But this is just one of the possible
choice functions that one can construct in order to prove Lemma 4. For
instance another possibility is to build c() such that it satisﬁes condition x ↑
for all the alternatives in X—i.e. deﬁning c(Ai) = x ∀i ∈ RX such that:
x ∈ % –gr(A); and ∀y ∈ % –gr(A), i(x) > i(y) or i(x) = i(y)∧x <O y8. The
interpretation of Lemma 4 is that, if an agent chooses maximizing a complete
and quasi–transitive preference relation, then his/her behaviour can be seen
“as if” he chooses according to a constrained indexed choice function.
After having obtained the results in Lemmas 2, 3, and 4, it is straight-
forward to prove the main proposition of the paper. In fact Lemmas 2 and
3 prove that a choice correspondence C() is induced by a constrained in-
dexed choice function c() is rationalized by the revealed preference relation
R that is complete and quasi–transitive, while Lemma 4 shows that if there
is a complete and quasi–transitive preference relation % whose maximization
determines the choice correspondence C(), then there exists a constrained
indexed choice function c() that induces C().
What is left to prove is the independence of the axioms and in order to
do this we provide two examples. In the ﬁrst example we provide a case
in which Monotonicity is satisﬁed and Conditional IIA is not while in the
second example Conditional IIA is satisﬁed and Monotonicity is not.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the following situation, suppose X = {x,y,z} and
suppose that, for all the index function i ∈ RX, x = c({x,y,z}i) ,
x = c({x,z}i), y = c({x,y}i), and y = c({z,y}i). This indexed choice
function satisﬁes the Monotonicity property but not the Conditional
IIA property. Indeed if Monotonicity had been satisﬁed we would have
that x = c({x,y,z}i) implying x = c({x,y}i) while we have that y =
c({x,y}i).
EXAMPLE 2. Consider this diﬀerent situation, suppose X = {x,y,z} and
suppose that: x = c({x,y,z}i) for all i ∈ RX such that i(x)  = 0 and
8A third diﬀerent possibility is to choose a number k ∈ R and to deﬁne c(Ai) = x for
all the i ∈ RX such that: x ∈ % –gr(A); and either (1) ∀y ∈ % –gr(A) such that ¬x <O y,
i(y) < k ∧ i(x) ≥ k; or (2) ∀y ∈ % –gr(A), i(y) < k ∧ y <O x.
16y = c({x,y,z}i) for all i ∈ RX such that i(x) = 0; x = c({x,z}i)
for all i ∈ RX; x = c({x,y}i) for all i ∈ RX such that i(x)  = 0 and
y = c({x,y}i) for all i ∈ RX such that i(x) = 0; and y = c({z,y}i)
for all i ∈ RX. In this case it is easy to verify that Conditional IIA
is satisﬁed while Monotonicity is not. Indeed taking an index function
such that i(x) > 0 we have not x ↓ since y = c({x,y,z}i) for all i ∈ RX
such that i(x) = 0, and taking an index function such that i(x) < 0 we
have not x ↑ for the same reason. Hence this indexed choice function
does not satisfy Monotonicity.
3 Connections with other models
In this section we review two works closely related to our model. The ﬁrst
model was developed by Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and proposes a more
abstract framework of choices conditioned to unobservable information. The
second model is a model of social choice developed by Sen (1969) in which
the author shows that, under some conditions, the aggregation of individual
preference relations produces a quasi–transitive social preference relation,
which is a result similar to the aggregation of constrained indexed choice
function.
The idea to attach an unobservable component to the choice set is not
new. Indeed, Bernheim and Rangel (2008) and Salant and Rubinstein (2008)
have developed a framework of choices with frames. The main intuition of
Salant and Rubinstein is to attach to the class of choice problems (D) a class
of frames called F. According to Salant and Rubinstein (2008), a frame is an
abstract object that can reﬂect both observable ancillary information, such
as the position of alternatives, and unobservable internal manipulation used
by an agent in the choice process. Formally, an extended choice problem
is deﬁned as a pair (A,f) where A ∈ D and f ∈ F is the abstract object
called frame. Accordingly, the extended choice function c∗ is a function
that assigns an element of A to every extended choice problem (A,f) and a
standard choice correspondence induced by the extended choice function Cc∗
where Cc∗(A) is the set of elements chosen from the set A for some frame f
17(Salant and Rubinstein, 2008).
Salant and Rubinstein (2008) show that, if an extended choice function is
a Salient Consideration function and it satisﬁes property γ–extended, then
the standard choice correspondence induced by the extended choice function
is indistinguishable from the choice produced by the maximization of an
asymmetric and transitive binary relation. In their model, an extended choice
function is Salient Consideration if for every frame f ∈ F, there exists a
corresponding ordering ≻f such that c(A,f) is the ≻f –max(A). Moreover
they say that an extended choice function satisﬁes property γ–extended if
c(A,f) = x and c(B,g) = x, implies that there exists a frame h such that
c(A ∪ B,h) = x. Notice that there is a manifest relationship between the
deﬁnitions proposed by Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and our deﬁnition and
indeed, as we point out in the next paragraph, the two models are equivalent
from a formal point of view.
In order to see the close relationship of the two models, note that a Salient
Consideration function also satisﬁes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
and a choice function that satisﬁes IIA is a Salient Consideration function.
Hence, since a constrained indexed choice function satisﬁes Conditional IIA,
then it is a Salient Consideration Function. Moreover, a constrained indexed
choice function satisﬁes also property γ–extended. In order to see this it
is enough to look at the proof lemma 2, where we show that the choice
correspondence induced by an indexed choice function satisﬁes Sen’s property
γ. Therefore, the model of choice with psychological index can be seen as
a member of the bigger family of models deﬁned by Salant and Rubinstein
(2008). Indeed, the index function attached to the choice set can be thought
as a frame in the model of choice with frames.
Although our model can be seen like a speciﬁcation of the Salant and
Rubinstein’s model, it is worth considering that, if it is impossible to distin-
guish choices produced by the maximization of an asymmetric and transitive
relation—i.e., the optimization of a complete and quasi–transitive relation—
and choices induced by a Salient Consideration function satisfying property
γ–extended, then it is also impossible to distinguish them from choices in-
duced by a constrained indexed choice function. In this situation, whenever
18the frame is unobservable, one can interpret choices “as if” there was a
measure attached to each alternative in the choice set that can aﬀect choices
according to the Monotonicity property. That is, if choices can be interpreted
by using Salant and Rubinstein (2008)’s model you can always interpret the
same choices in light of our model. Notice, however, that this is just an
interpretation of the choice behaviour; the decision maker does not neces-
sarily chooses according to a measure attached to the alternatives, but he
chooses “as if” that was the case. Moreover, even if a constrained indexed
choice function which induces a choice correspondence compatible with the
observed behaviour may exists, it may be the case that is impossible to pro-
vide a meaningful interpretation to the indexes attached to the alternatives.
On the other hand, there are psychological models in the literature that in-
deed use unobservable psychological measures in order to explain behaviour,
e.g., availability or salience, and hence if it is supposed that these measures
have a monotonic eﬀect on choices, then the model of choices with psycho-
logical index is well-suited for showing that, such behaviour is not far from
rationality.
The model about social choices by Sen (1969) is closely linked with both
our and Salant and Rubinstein (2008) models. The author shows that it is
possible to ﬁnd an aggregation of complete and transitive individual prefer-
ence relations that results into a quasi–transitive social preference relation.
In this model Sen considers a complete and transitive relation Ri for each
subject i in the community and then he proposes the following aggregation
rule in order to build the social preference relation S:
xSy ⇔ ¬[(∀i yRix) ∧ (∃i | yPix)]
where Ri is the weak preference relation of agent i, Pi is the strict preference
of agent i, and S is the social preference relation. Notice that the meaning of
this aggregation procedures is that x is socially excluded from being chosen
by y—i.e., x is not socially weakly preferred to y—only if all the members
of the community weakly prefers y to x and there is someone in the com-
munity that strictly prefers y to x. Using this aggregation procedure, the
19author shows that the social preference relation S is a complete and quasi–
transitive relation whose maximization produces a social choice satisfying
Arrow’s conditions (see Sen, 1969, p. 386).
Concerning our model, the most interesting aspect of Sen (1969) is that
there is an aggregation of complete and transitive individual preference that
produces a complete and quasi–transitive social choice relation. Indeed, since
the Conditional IIA property implies that ﬁxing the index function i one
has a linear ordering ≻i representing preferences, one can interpret the ﬁnal
choice as the aggregation of preferences of a community of “multiple-selves”
composed by the index functions. However, our aggregation procedure is
diﬀerent from the one used by Sen. Our procedure is motivated by the
unobservability of the indexes—i.e., the unobservability of the voter that is
in charge of taking the decision—while the aggregation used by Sen is a social
decision function—i.e., a voting rule—used to produce a collective choice.
Notwithstanding, it may be interesting to compare the two aggregation
procedures. Conditional IIA implies that for each index function i (i.e., for
each voter) we have a linear ordering ≻i, that is a complete, transitive, and
antisymmetric preference relation. Antisymmetry implies that given x,y ∈ X
such that x  = y, x ≻i y implies ¬y ≻i x, thus x ≻i y implies yPix. Hence,
by using the aggregation rule proposed by Sen we have that if x ≻i y for
some index function i, then xSy where S is the social preference deﬁned
as xSy ⇔ ¬[(∀i yRix) ∧ (∃i | yPix)]. Consider now the revealed preference
relation R constructed by using a choice correspondence C() induced by an
indexed choice function c() that satisﬁes Conditional IIA, i.e., xRy ⇔ x ∈
C(A) =
 
f∈RX c(Af) ∧ y ∈ A. On the one hand, we have that if xRy then
there exists a set A ∈ D such that x ∈ C(A) ∧ y ∈ A that means that there
is an index function i such that x ≻i y and hence xSy. On the other hand,
suppose that xSy, then there is an index function i such that x ≻i y and hence
x = c({x,y}i). Thus x ∈ C({x,y}) that implies xRy. Hence, if the indexed
choice function satisﬁes the Conditional IIA property—that is equivalent to
have a population of linear orderings—it implies that the revealed preference
relation R constructed using the induced choice correspondence is equivalent
to the Sen’s social preference relation S, and hence it is complete and quasi–
20transitive (see Sen, 1969, p. 287, Theorem V).
Thus it seems that the Conditional IIA is suﬃcient in order to get the
quasi–transitivity of our revealed preference relation R, but notice that with-
out the Monotonicity property we cannot show that R − gr(A) = C(A) =
 
f∈RX c(Af). For this purpose, consider the following example satisfying
Conditional IIA but not Monotonicity.
EXAMPLE 3. Consider the following situation, suppose X = {x,y,z} and
suppose that: (1) for all the index function i ∈ RX such that i(x) > 0:
z = c({x,y,z}i), z = c({x,z}i), x = c({x,y}i), and z = c({z,y}i);
while (2) for all the index function i ∈ RX such that i(x) ≤ 0: y =
c({x,y,z}i), x = c({x,z}i), y = c({x,y}i), and y = c({z,y}i). This
indexed choice function satisﬁes the Conditional IIA property but not
the Monotonicity property and it is easy to verify that in case (1)
choices are produced by the maximization of the following linear order
z ≻i y, y ≻i x, z ≻i x, x ≻i x, y ≻i y, and z ≻i z; while in case (2)
choices are produced by the maximization of this linear order y ≻i x,
x ≻i z, y ≻i z, x ≻i x, y ≻i y, and z ≻i z. Thus if we consider the
induced choice correspondence C() we have that C(X) = {z,y} while
the set R − gr(X) is equal to {x,y,z}.
Example 3 shows that the two models are diﬀerent in the sense that, even
if we can interpret our choice procedure like an aggregation of Multiple Selves
preferences, we require that the alternatives chosen by the maximization of
the social preference relation are equal to the union of the alternatives chosen
by each “self” present in the decision maker. Moreover, notice that is not true
that all the alternatives chosen by the Social Preference S = R in a situation
A are chosen by the decision maker. Indeed, we have a rule that decide which
self is responsible for the decision according to the indexes attached to the
alternatives. More explicitly, we have that, according to the psychological
situation, there is a “self” i that is the dictator of the decision maker, and
only the unconditional behaviour can be interpreted as if an aggregation of
preferences satisfying Arrow’s conditions9.
9Notice that with Monotonicity property we indeed constrain the possible combination
21A ﬁnal remark about the relationship between our model and models of
social choices has to be made. Even if the multiple self interpretation looks
appealing, we would point out that it is not the main interpretation of our
model. Indeed, if we follow this interpretation, then the Monotonicity prop-
erty will impose restrictions on the behaviour of the selves in the population.
For instance, an implication of the Monotonicity property is that, if there
are two selves i and j that choose the same alternative x from respectively
the sets A and B, then there must exist a self u that chooses the alternative
x from the set A ∪ B. Clearly, this feature of the model is at odd with the
idea of having a population of multiple selves. Indeed the idea of multiple
selves implicitly assumes that the behaviour of one self is independent from
the behaviour of another self.
4 Some welfare consideration
This section of the paper discusses the issue of welfare analysis using be-
havioural models. Indeed, one of the main weaknesses of behavioural models
is that they are well suited for a positive description of choice behaviour while
they usually fail to provide normative guidance for welfare decisions.
One of the main diﬃculties of behavioural models is that they usually
allow for preference reversal, i.e., the decision maker is willing to choose an
alternative x from a set A under some circumstances while he is willing to
choose y from A under some others—e.g., endowment eﬀect, framing eﬀect,
status quo bias, etc.— These circumstances are usually not observable or
are at least diﬃcult to observe externally. Hence, the external observer can-
not unambiguously determine if the individual will be better–oﬀ or not by
switching from the alternative x to the alternative y. For instance, a social
planner that has to decide between x and y for the individual cannot de-
termine which alternative is preferred. The problem is even more severe in
of individual orderings, hence not all the Arrow’s conditions are satisﬁed. In particular
condition of Unrestricted Domain of the aggregation function (see condition “U” Sen,
1969, p. 386) turns out to be violated. The Monotonicity property implies that if there
are two individuals i and j that choose the same alternative x from respectively the sets A
and B then there exists an individual u that chooses the alternative x from the set A∪B.
22cases where the change in choices depends upon the intervention of the social
planner. Indeed, also by assuming that the social planner knows the subject
is willing to choose x over y, the social planner probably has no elements to
determine how the taste of the decision maker is going to be altered by an
intervention. It could be the case that the decision maker has changed his
mind and is now willing to choose y over x.
These considerations cast doubts on the possibility of developing norma-
tive welfare analysis in behavioural models. However, some authors (Bernheim and Rangel,
2008; Green and Hojman, 2007) have recently tried to overcome these short-
comings by providing a generalization of welfare concepts that would allow
welfare policies to be developed on the basis of behavioural models. Start-
ing from the consideration that also standard welfare analysis is based on
choices and not on utility, Bernheim and Rangel (2008) propose a revealed
preference framework for welfare analysis which, in theory, is able to in-
clude all behavioural models. These authors deﬁne the notion of ancillary
condition as “a feature of the choice environment that may aﬀect behav-
ior, but that is not taken as relevant to a social planner’s choice once the
decision has been delegated to him” (Bernheim and Rangel, 2008, p. 4).
Then they model a generalized choice situation as a subset of the univer-
sal collection of alternative X coupled with an ancillary condition—i.e., a
pair (A,d) where A is a subset of X and d is an ancillary condition—and
they let choices be dependent upon diﬀerent ancillary conditions. Using this
approach, Bernheim and Rangel (2008) are able to build individual welfare
relations and to deﬁne the concept of individual welfare optima, thus showing
that is possible to make basic welfare comparisons also without well–behaved
preference relations or utility functions10.
The model proposed in this paper is similar to that of Bernheim and Rangel
(2008) in interpreting the index function as an ancillary condition. Hence,
following the same line of reasoning of Bernheim and Rangel (2008), it can
be used to determine whether the decision maker is better–oﬀ by switching
10In the article Bernheim and Rangel (2008) go further than this. They provide a gener-
alization for the concepts of equivalent and compensating variation and they also suggest
a generalization of the ﬁrst welfare theorem. But this it is outside the scope of this section.
23from one alternative to another. The model assumes that the external ob-
server cannot know the psychological indexes the decision maker attaches
to the alternatives and that choices are conditioned upon the psychologi-
cal situation the decision maker perceives. As shown above, the observable
part of the decision maker’s behaviour is given by the induced choice cor-
respondence, which simply records all the alternatives chosen by the agent
from a set A for all psychological situations. This implies that, for instance,
when the external observer knows that x and y are chosen from {x,y}, he
is unable to say whether the subject is currently willing to choose x over y
or y over x. The external observer only knows that there are situations—
i.e., some index function i—in which the subject is willing to choose x and
other situations—another index function j—in which the subject is willing
to choose y.
Despite this diﬃculty, the revealed preference relation R provides insights
into the welfare of the decision maker. The relation R—deﬁned as xRy iﬀ
∃A ⊆ X such that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ A, where C(A) =
 
f∈RX c(Af)—is
based on the observable part of choices and thus it can be inferred by the
external observer. In the model’s section, it was shown that the revealed
preference relation has the property of rationalizing the observable part of
the choices, but it can also be used for deriving welfare implications. If we
consider the asymmetric part P of the relation, i.e., xPy iﬀ xRy ∧ ¬yRx,
having xPy for some alternative x and y expresses the fact that the agent
is always willing to choose x over y, independently from the psychological
situation he faces. Thus, whenever the external observer can record that
xPy, he can unambiguously conclude that the decision maker is better–oﬀ
when he is given x instead of y. Hence, P can be used as an individual
welfare relation, and it is also possible to deﬁne the concept of individual
welfare optimum. Borrowing the deﬁnition of individual welfare optima by
Bernheim and Rangel (2008), we can say that an alternative x ∈ A is im-
provable when there is an alternative y ∈ A such that yPx, and whenever
this is not the case we can say that x is an individual welfare optimum in
A11.
11Note that the asymmetric part of our revealed preference relation R is equivalent to
24Under these circumstances some basic welfare consideration can be drawn,
but it is necessary to underline that, whenever two alternatives x and y are
not ranked by the asymmetric part P of R, it is impossible for the external
observer to decide whether the decision maker is willing to choose x over y
or y over x. More precisely, the observer knows that there are psychological
situations in which the decision maker is willing to choose x over y and other
situations in which the subject is willing to choose y over x.
This consideration also helps in interpreting the symmetric part of the
revealed preference relation R. Indeed, the symmetric part I of the revealed
preference relation R is usually thought as revealing indiﬀerence between two
alternatives, but in our model I can be given a diﬀerent and more precise
interpretation. Recalling the deﬁnition of I—i.e., xIy iﬀ xRy ∧ yRx—xIy
implies that there are situations in which the agent chooses x over y and
situations in which he chooses y over x, but given a speciﬁc situation he is
never indiﬀerent between the two. thus we can say that instead of revealing
indiﬀerence, the relation I reveals the absence of an observable unambiguous
preference ordering between the two alternatives. That is, I can be thought
not to capture the indiﬀerence of the decision maker but the impossibility
for the external observer to observe some relevant part of information.
Further insights can be gained by interpreting the model as a multiple–self
model. This interpretation clariﬁes the concept of individual welfare opti-
mum. Considering each index function as a distinct self we ﬁnd that if two
alternatives x,y ∈ A belong to the items chosen from A—i.e., x,y ∈ C(A)—
then they are not ranked by P and hence are both individual welfare optima
in A. Nevertheless, these alternatives are also two Pareto equilibria for the so-
ciety of multiple selves. Indeed, if we ﬁx x, we have xIy for all the y ∈ C(A),
and is impossible to ﬁnd an alternative in A that is preferred by all the
selves; hence, it is also impossible to improve the well–being of one self with-
the welfare relation P∗—xP∗y iﬀ, for all (A,d) such that x,y ∈ A, y ∈ C(A,d) implies
x ∈ C(X,d)—proposed by Bernheim and Rangel (2008). Note also that while the authors
deﬁne the relation R′—xR′y iﬀ, for all (A,d) such that x,y ∈ A, y ∈ C(A,d) implies
x ∈ C(X,d)—and they use its asymmetric part when deﬁning the concept of weak im-
provement, such relation is based on the observability of the ancillary conditions, which
is ruled out in our setting. Consequently we cannot speak about weak and strict welfare
optima.
25out reducing the well-being of another self by moving from x. Consequently,
without additional information about the indexes, the social planner cannot
do better than randomly assigning one of the individual Pareto optima to
the agent12.
5 Interpretation of the Indexes
As mentioned in the previous sections the indexes attached to the alterna-
tives have various interpretations. Among the possible interpretations of the
indexes, the more interesting ones are the following:
• Perceived Availability. This interpretation of the indexes is sug-
gested by the psychological studies about the so called Commodity The-
ory developed by Brock (1968) and others (Brock and Brannon, 1992).
For this theory the more an alternative is perceived hard to obtain, i.e.,
it is perceived “scarce”, the more the alternative become attractive for
the subjects. Indeed, there are experiments, mainly in experimental
psychology, which tested the eﬀect of the perceived availability of goods
on preferences (Verhallen, 1982; Lynn, 1989, 1991; Lynn and Bogert,
1996; Mittone et al., 2005; Mittone and Savadori, 2008). Manipulating
the information about the easiness of obtaining the goods or the nu-
merosity of each good available for the choice, these experiments have
provided evidence supporting the sensitivity of preferences to the per-
ceived availability of the good. In particular they have shown how a
reduction (increment) of the manipulated availability (scarcity) of the
goods produces an increase (decrease) of the likelihood of choice of that
good.
In the light of this evidence one can interpret the indexes of our model
like a measure of the perceived availability of the alternative. More
precisely, the index attached to an alternative can be thought like a
12Note that this interpretation has to be taken with some reservations, we have already
pointed out the diﬃculties of this interpretation at the end of the previous section and we
want to stress the fact that this interpretation has to be considered a good tool of analysis
but is not the main interpretation of the model.
26psychological measure of the easiness of obtaining the alternative. Us-
ing this interpretation of the indexes and considering the fact that
increasing the scarcity of the good will increase its attractiveness, it
seems sensible to assume that, if an alternative is chosen when it has
a given level of perceived availability, reducing its availability the de-
cision maker will continue to choose the same alternative. Similarly if
a non chosen alternative is perceived as more easy to obtain, i.e. an
increase in the index, this will not have eﬀect on choices since the rel-
ative scarcity of the chosen alternative will increase. Hence, with this
interpretation, it is sensible to assume that Monotonicity works only in
the ‘↓’ direction.
• Snob and Bandwagon eﬀects. The second interpretation of the
indexes builds on the work of Leibenstein (1950), in which the author
pointed out that the individual demand of some good can be inﬂuenced
by the overall level of its market demand. Considering the direction of
the relation between individual and market demand, Leibenstein (1950)
deﬁnes two types of eﬀects: if the individual demand increases with
the market demand we have the so called “bandwagon eﬀect”; while if
the individual demand decreases with the market demand of the good
we have the so called “snob eﬀect”. Therefore, reinterpreting the two
eﬀects from a choice perspective, we can look at the index attached to
the alternative like the level of popularity (diﬀusion) of the alternative
in a reference group, e.g., we can see the indexes like the number of
decision maker’s friends that already possess the alternative. Notice
that this interpretation of the indexes can be also motivated by the
psychological phenomena regarding the “need for uniqueness” and the
“need for conformity” (Hornsey and Jetten, 2004). According to these
theories people compare themselves to others to assess their similarity
to and distinctiveness from these others, this because of the opposing
needs to be included in social groups and to be distinctive from others.
Using this interpretation of the indexes we can model the snob and
bandwagon eﬀect from a choice perspective. Indeed with this interpre-
27tation, there is a natural interpretation of the meaning of the Mono-
tonicity property. That is we have a snob eﬀect for those alternatives
that are of type ‘↓’—if I chose an alternative when it has a given level
of popularity, I continue to choose it when it becomes less popular—
while we have a bandwagon eﬀect for those alternatives that are of type
‘↑’—if I chose an alternative when it has a given level of popularity, I
continue to choose it when it becomes more popular. Finally there is
neither bandwagon nor snob eﬀect for the alternatives of type ‘ ’.
• Salience. A third interpretation of the indexes is to assume that they
represent the salience of the alternatives for the decision maker in that
particular choice task. The concept of salience is very broad and the
term “salient” has often been used as a synonymous of noticeable,
prominent but it has also been interpreted diﬀerently in diﬀerent ﬁelds.
For instance, in marketing literature the concept of brand salience has
been often equated with “the prominence or level of activation of a
brand in memory” (Alba and Chattopadhyay, 1986) while in cogni-
tive science—in particular in vision research—the concept of salience
is closely related to a measure of the ability of diﬀerent stimuli to at-
tract the visual attention of the decision maker in diﬀerent situations
(Huang and Pashler, 2005; Itti, 2006, 2007). For our purposes we con-
sider salience as the level of importance or relevance that the decision
maker attaches to the alternative with respect to the particular choice
task he is facing.
Using this deﬁnition of salience it is sensible to assume that if an alter-
native is chosen when it has a given level of salience, then it has to be
chosen when the salience of that alternative becomes higher, and that
if an alternative is non–chosen when it has a given level of salience,
then it continues to be non–chosen when the salience of that alterna-
tive becomes lower. Hence also in this case we restrict the behaviour
of the Monotonicity property to the ‘↑’ direction.
• Reason–Based Choices. The fourth and the last interpretation of
the indexes is based on the psychological research about reason based
28choices. As Shaﬁr et al. (1993) pointed out, the making of a decision
is often diﬃcult because of uncertainty and conﬂict. People usually
considers reasons for and against each option in order to choose and
the decisions depends on the weights attached to the option’s pros and
cons (e.g., the famous list of pros and cons written by Charles Darwin
deciding to get married or not). Considering a simpliﬁed version of this
approach one can interpret the index of an alternative like the number
of reasons supporting the choice of that alternative, or like the net
number of pros and cons of the alternative or also like the net sum of
the weighted pros and cons13.
Obviously interpreting the indexes like the number of supporting rea-
sons for choosing each alternative it is reasonable to restrict the Mono-
tonicity property only to the ‘↑’ direction. That means that it is sen-
sible to assume that: on the one hand, if I choose an alternative when
I have a given number of pros, incrementing its pros I should continue
to choose that alternative; and, on the other hand, if I reject an al-
ternative when I have a given number of pros I still reject it when the
number of pros is lower.
After having introduced some possible interpretation of the indexes, we
want to point out a couple of important aspects. First of all it is not necessar-
ily true that the chosen alternative is the scarcest one or the most salient one
or the one that has the higher number of pros. Indeed the choice depends not
just on the indexes but also on the diﬀerent alternatives. The choice is the
product of the interplay between the indexes and the alternatives to which
the indexes are attached. But, even if this feature of the model sounds a little
bit odd, we want to underline the fact that both perceived availability and
salience do not require that the scarcer or more salient alternative in a set
that has to be chosen. Indeed if we consider salience as prominence the deci-
sion maker can be immediately attracted by the most prominent alternative
13See Bettman et al. (1998) for procedures that attach to each alternative a
weighted sum of psychological evaluations of the alternative’s attributes and see
Alba and Marmorstein (1987) for evidence of the use of frequencies of pros like a choice
heuristic.
29but then he can become aware of the presence of less salient alternatives and
he may ﬁnally choose one of these alternatives. However, notice that also
the procedure that selects the alternative with the highest (lowest) index is
compatible with the properties of our model as the proof of Lemma 4 has
shown.
A second aspect of these interpretations is that, in the light of the main
proposition of the paper, the overall choice can be also interpreted as a two
stage procedure in which at the ﬁrst stage the decision maker deems choosable
a subset of the available options according to a quasi–transitive preference
relation and consequently he chooses according to the “numbers” (salience
level, perceived availability, etc.) attached to them.
A third point is that, in some of the previous interpretations, it seems
reasonable to restrict the domain of the indexes. For instance it seems natural
to think salience as a positive real and the number of decision maker’s friends
possessing the alternative is obviously restricted to the domain of natural
numbers. However these restrictions of the domain of the indexes do not
alter the results of the model. Indeed, the proofs of the propositions are still
valid considering indexes that belong to the set of the natural numbers, or
to convex subsets of the set of reals, or also to closed intervals of natural
numbers.
A ﬁnal remark about the interpretations of the indexes is that they can
be always considered also as a measure of distance between the alternatives
and a reference point in a psychological space in which the decision maker
may encode the alternatives. An example may be a manager that has to hire
a new secretary. In this case the alternatives are the candidates for the job,
and the indexes may represent the unobservable information about the social
distance between the manager and the candidates. Notice that interpreting
the indexes as distances requires a minor modiﬁcation about the domain of
the indexes, that in this case does not span over the entire real line, but only
on the non–negative half–line.
306 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a model in which choices are aﬀected by some
psychological elements assumed to be an unobservable measure that the de-
cision maker attaches to each alternative in a universal collection. It has
been shown that if choices conditioned by these measures satisfy two intu-
itively appealing properties, namely Monotonicity and Conditional IIA, then
the observable part of the choice behaviour, i.e., the unconditional choices,
can be interpreted as the product of the maximization of a preference rela-
tion. Two related models were then examined and four interpretations of the
measure attached to the alternatives were provided.
Two concluding remarks about the implications of the model are due.
The ﬁrst remark is related to the rationality issue, while the second one
regards the issue of the experimental testability of the model.
Starting with the ﬁrst issue, the main result of the paper is supporting
the idea that the decision maker’s unconditional behaviour can be interpreted
“as if” rational. However, the spirit of the paper is not to pursuit the idea
that all the psychological phenomena can and should be rationalized, but to
show that some of these phenomena can be treated by means of standard
economic tools. The paper is aimed to show that, whenever it is possible
to have a sensible explanation of the indexes, e.g., in case of salience or in
case of perceived availability, it is possible to give the choice behaviour an
economic interpretation in terms of underlying preferences and to use the
revealed preference relation to derive some basic welfare considerations.
Concerning the testability of the theory this is not an easy task. The
unobservability of the indexes raises a major issue about testability. Usually
choice axioms provide simple statements about choices that can be tested
experimentally, but in our case choice behaviour is conditional to an unob-
servable component that cannot be controlled in an experimental setting.
To make more clear the issue consider the following example: suppose an
experimenter wants to test Conditional IIA. This person should ﬁrst let the
decision maker choose from a set of available alternatives and then let him
choose from a smaller set in order to check if the subject sticks to the same
31choice or not. Suppose then that the experimenter observes a change in the
chosen alternative, in this case he is unable to determine whether the change
is due to a change in the psychological situation or to a violation of the Con-
ditional IIA. The only way the experimenter can test Conditional IIA is to
be sure to observe the choices from the smaller set for all the psychologichal
situations. The previous example raises important concerns about testabil-
ity. In order to test the model one have to make a strong assumption about
the independence of indexes and sets of alternatives.
Another issue concerns the testability of Monotonicity, in this case the
set of alternatives is kept ﬁxed but one have to assume that the experimenter
has a form of control of the indexes. Consider the perceived availability in-
terpretation of the indexes. In this case one has to assume that manipulating
the experimental situation it is possible to, e.g., reduce the perceived avail-
ability of the chosen alternative in order to check whether the decision maker
sticks to that alternative. Thus also in this case we have to assume that the
experimental manipulations change the psychological situation in the desired
direction.
Notice however that the need of additional assumption—although not
strong as our assumptions—is not a peculiarity of our model, it pertains
also to other models. Testing the standard theory of intertemporal choices,
for instance, requires some additional requirements about the stability of
preferences and income level in time.
327 Appendix: Deﬁnitions
Def (Sen’s Property α). A choice correspondence C() satisﬁes Sen’s Property
α if x ∈ C(A) and x ∈ B ⊆ A implies that x ∈ C(B).
Def (Sen’s Property γ). A choice correspondence C() satisﬁes Sen’s Property
γ if x ∈ C(A) and x ∈ C(B) implies that x ∈ C(A ∪ B).
Def (Sen’s Property δ). A choice correspondence C() satisﬁes Sen’s Property
δ if for any pair of sets A,B ∈ D such that A ⊂ B and x,y ∈ C(A). then
C(B)  = {x}.
Def (Sen’s Property β). A choice correspondence C() satisﬁes Sen’s Property
β if for any pair of sets A,B ∈ D such that A ⊂ B, x,y ∈ C(A) and x ∈ C(B)
then y ∈ C(B).
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